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NOTE
PARODY AND BURLESQUEFAIR USE OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT?
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Loew's, Inc.,' the Supreme
Court of the United States aroused great concern in the entertainment world 2 when it affirmed (by an evenly divided court) a lower
court decision enjoining CBS from producing a television burlesque
by comedian Jack Benny of the motion picture Gaslight. Plaintiff
Loew's had claimed an infringement of their copyright. CBS countered
with the contention that their parody was a "fair use" of plaintiff's
work. In affirming, the Supreme Court, in its initial consideration of
this issue, placed its imprimatur upon a decision which takes the
position that parody and burlesque do not come within the shelter of
fair use.3 Thus, further development of the emergent, although amorphous, doctrine of a parody as a fair use unfortunately seems scotched
at least for the present. For if the doctrine of fair use is not applicable
to them, parody and burlesque would seem by their very nature to
constitute an infringement per se. Insofar as a burlesque, if it is to be
effective, must necessarily partake of plot or subject of the original,
to protect the original on grounds that the burlesque is closely parallel
in form is to deny the burlesque its existence. Regrettably, this position seriously threatens the development of these important and
established literary forms.
The facts of this case illustrate the troublesome nature of this problem.4 In 1942, Loew's obtained exclusive motion picture rights to the
Broadway play Angel Street,5 and began production of a motion
picture. The original film was released for distribution in 1944.
1. 356 U.S. 43 (1958) (per curiam), affirming by an equally divided Court
Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affirming Loew's Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955). Mr.
Justice Douglas took no part in the Supreme Court decision.
2. See, e.g., Poore, "Ardent Plea for the Art of Parody," N.Y. Times Magazine, Mar. 9, 1958, p. 33; KAPLAN AND BROWN, COPYRIGHT AND UNFAIR COMPETITION,

463 bk.II (temp. ed. 1958).

3. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165,

183 (S.D. Cal. 1955), aff'd, 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) (affirming "for the reasons set forth in the opinion of [the district court judge]" Id. at 537), aff'd, 356
U.S. 43 (1958) (4-4, per: curiam). Citations to this case will be made to the
district court decision, supra, unless otherwise indicated.
4. For a more comprehensive treatment, see Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REV. 1130, 1148-49 (1955).
5. By Patrick Hamilton, one of the plaintiffs. The American copyright was
secured in 1941; the English copyright in 1939. The play was written and
first produced in England under the title of Gaslight.
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Domestic release was ended in 1946. International distribution still
continued at the time of the suit, but no re-issue had been made.6 In
1945, Benny produced a fifteen minute radio burlesque of it, starring
himself and Ingrid Bergman, one of the stars of the original picture.
Loew's claimed no infringement by this, although their consent was
not sought. Benny did request that the picture be shown, for the week
preceding his broadcast, at the military base from which his show
originated. Loew's sent the print as requested. From this the district
court foun implied consent.7 In 1952, after domestic distribution of
the film had ceased, CBS produced a television program in which
Benny did a fifteen minute burlesque of the movie. Loew's notified
CBS that they considered the performance an infringement, but did
nothing further. In 1953 CBS began preparation of a motion picture
for television, entitled Autolight, starring Benny, and again burlesquing Gaslight. On June 9, 1953, Loew's served notice that they
considered the live broadcast and the proposed remake an infringement of their copyright. This suit was filed on June 10, 1953.8
At the trial, defendants urged that, as parody, their production came
within the settled doctrine of "fair use" and was therefore not an infringement. After setting out a detailed comparison of Autolight and
Gaslight, the district court found that the two works were similar in
that: (1) the locale and period of the works were the same; (2) the
main setting was the same; (3) the characters were, generally, the
same; (4) the story points were practically identical; (5) the development of the story, the treatment, incidents, sequence of events, points
of suspense and climax were almost identical (except that defendants'
treatment was burlesque) and (6) there had been a detailed borrowing
of much of the dialogue, with some variation in wording. The court
6. The picture has since been shown on television. In fact, in Nashville,
Tennessee, when Benny was finally allowed to show his television movie (the
arrangements made with the copyright holders are not known) on Sunday,
Jan. 11, 1959, the plaintiff's motion picture was shown as the feature on the
"late show" that same night.
7. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165,
169 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
8. Plaintiffs also claimed damages for infringement, but this was waived at
the trial. A claim of unfair competition was based upon Loew's contention
of trade name infringement of the movie title, but this was not seriously
contended for by the plaintiffs. The claim was dismissed as there had been
no attempt to deceive the public. Actually, considering the heated competition between the motion picture and television industries at that time, the
suit seems to have been a part of the competition between them. It is doubtful
whether the plaintiffs were primarily concerned about the future of their
movie. In such a case, considerations within the area of unfair competition,
a question of what constitutes "fair play" between competitors, were involved.
Any competition between the television skit and the movie is apparently negligible at the most. For a discussion of unfair competition and other doctrines
beyond copyright, see generally, KAPLAN AND BROWN, COPYRIGHT AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION 463, bk. II (temp. ed. 1958).
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concluded that there had been a substantial taking from plaintiffs'
original work.9
The court below refused to recognize parody and burlesque as independent forms of creative effort possessing distinctive qualities and
entitled to the same protection under the copyright law as any other
art form. This was a case extreme in its facts as to the degree of
appropriation. Had the court wished to apply the doctrine of "fair
use" a finding that its limits were exceeded could easily have been
justified. Not only did the court refuse to apply this doctrine its application was not even discussed. The result reached was perhaps the
correct one, but the theory upon which it was predicated'0 is surely
erroneous. The long literary history of parody and burlesque, the
special qualities which distinguish them as a particular creative form,
and their judicial history, scant though it is, were ignored by the court
below. In holding that parody and burlesque are to be treated as any
other appropriation a principle has been established which may well
deny the application of the doctrine of fair use to all future parody and
burlesque, however far removed they may be from the factual pattern
upon which the decision was based. Insofar as these are old, recognized, and socially desirable forms of literature and dramatic presentation, this result is particularly unfortunate.
A brief sketch of the background of copyright law is necessary in
order to depict the status of parody and burlesque within the framework of this law.
NATURE AND OBJECT OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

Copyright, as discussed in this note, is a statutory right. All copyright law in this country has as its source the Constitution of the
United States, which grants to Congress the power "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries."" Given this power to enact copyright laws, Congress
12
looked to the English copyright law, embodied in the Statute of Anne,
and upon this foundation enacted our own law of copyright. 13 Essen9. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Corp., supra note 7, at 171.
10. Note 117, infra.
11. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
12. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710). Although the idea that authors have certain rights
in their works is an ancient one, the application of sanctions to protect these
rights has arisen mainly since the invention of the art of printing made mass
dissemination of literary works possible. See BAWKES, COPYRiGHT, ITS HisTORY AND LAW 8 (1912); 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 17 (1939).
13. The first legislation was the Act of May 31, 1790, c. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124

which protected only "a map, chart, book or books." The Act of Apr. 9, 1802,
c. 36, § 2, 2 Stat. 171 extended this to historical prints. Protection was extended
to musical compositions by the Act of Feb. 3, 1831, c. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436. The
Act of Aug. 18, 1856, c. 169, § 1, 11 Stat. 138 gave the sole right to perform,
publish and act dramatic compositions. Motion pictures were added by the
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tially, copyright grants the right to "print, reprint, publish, copy and
vend" a work to the exclusion of others.14 It is a monopoly "to prevent
others from producing the copyrighted work."'15 The monopoly is
granted in the name of the constitutional purpose behind the grant
of power to Congress, namely, to promote the progress of science and
the useful arts. However, parody had been recognized as being an
independent form of artistic effort, and had been classified as one of the
useful arts before the Constitution existed.
Infringement of copyright is "the doing by any person, without the
consent of the owner of the copyright, of any thing the sole right to
do which is conferred by the statute on the owner of the copyright."' 16
All actions arising from infringement of literary and dramatic copyrights are based upon section one of the present copyright act. 17
The problem of plagiarism has distressed authors since the beginning
of the written word. It has been said that Homer probably is the most
original author, "probably for no other reason than that we can trace
the plagiarism no further."' 8 Normally, the infringement consists of
the copying of a plot, theme, sequence or story idea; it is seldom that
one reproduces verbatim. The courts have treated certain types of
material as not being within copyright protection. Methods or systems
relating to the arts may be appropriated, so long as the form is not
clearly imitated. 19 Similarly, general ideas are not protected 20 but only
Townsend Amendment in 1912, 37 Stat. 488. The most recent revision is 61
Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-215 (1952). Federal control extends only
to postpublication copyright, over which a federal court has exclusive jurisdiction. 17 U.S.C. § 2 (1952) reserves to an author his common law proprietary
right in his manuscript.
14. 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).

15. RCA 1Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1940). The monopoly

is not absolute as in the case of a patent as the copyright is subject to the
right of others to make fair use of it. 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 92 (1939). The U. S. statute does not explicitly recognize the so-called
"moral right" of the author to prevent publication of his work; not the right
to modify the work; or to prevent abusive criticism of it. For a discussion of
this phase of copyright, see Raeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in
the Law of Artists, Authors and Creators,53 HARV. L. REV. 554 (1940).
16. 18 C.J.S. Copyright and Literary Property § 90 (1939).
17. 61 Stat. 652 (1947), 17 U.S.C. § 1 (1952)
"(a) To print, reprint, publish, copy and vend the copyrighted work;
"(b) To translate... or make any other version thereof, if it be a literary
work; to dramatize it if it be a nondramatic work; to convert it into a
novel or other nondramatic work if it be a drama;...
"(d) To perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be a

drama or,... to make or to procure the making of any transcription or

record thereof by or from which, in whole or in part, it may in any manner

or by any method be exhibited, performed, represented, produced or
produce or reproduce it
reproduced; and to exhibit, perform, represent,
in any manner or by any method whatsoever. ... ,
18. HAzLITT, CHARACTERS OF SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS 104 (Everyman's ed.
1915), quoted in Yankwich, What is Fair Use, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 203, 215 (1954).
19. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879); West Pub. Co. v. Edward
Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). This is more properly considered under fair use. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
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the physical expression of those ideas. This stems from the assumption
that ideas are the common property of mankind 2' and that affording
such protection would violate a basic premise of the constitutional provision, i.e., the dissemination of knowledge and the progress of science
and useful arts. The questions to be considered in every infringement
case are: (1) Is the material in question copyrightable? (2) Did the
plaintiff satisfy the conditions precedent to copyright protection for
this material? 22 (3) Did the defendant copy the material? 23 It is the
latter question with which most litigation is concerned. The most cited
definition of "copy" is that of the English courts: "a copy is that which
comes so near to the original as to give every person seeing it the idea
created by the original." 24 "Copy" is also used to denote an infringement, in which case the courts require that the appropriation be
substantial. In this sense, "copy" has come to mean substantial appropriation. Even if substantial appropriation be found it has been engrafted as an exception that if the appropriation is a "fair use" of the
original, no infringement will be found.25 From these judicially engrafted qualifications to the copyright law it can be seen that the
monopoly granted the author is not so broad as a reading of the
statute might indicate.26
The statutory remedies for infringement are: (a) an injunction
restraining such infringement; (b) damages suffered by the proprietor
of the copyright, plus profits which defendant may have made; (c) the
impounding of the alleged infringing work during the suit; (d) destruction of the infringing copies and other specified remedies.27
It is necessary to briefly outline the historical and judicial application of these doctrines to the area of copyright law.
SUBSTANTILk

APPROPRIATION

Infringement of copyright may be loosely said to mean substantial
20. E.g., Salomon v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 780 (S.D.N.Y.
1942); Gropper v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.
1941). "To hold otherwise would deny others the right to treat the same
idea, although their treatment be original." But protection cannot be limited
to the actual wording, as that would allow the material to be copied and
expressed in synonyms.
21. Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHr. L. REV. 203, 207 (1954); Nimmer,
The Law of Ideas, 27 So. CAL. L. REV. 119 (1954).
22. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 10, 11, 13, 17 (1952).
23. Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1125, 1126
(1951).
24. West v. Francis, 5 B. & A. 738, 743, 106 Eng. Rep. 1361, 1363 (K.B. 1822),
adopted by the Supreme Court in White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Appolo Co.,
209 U.S. 1, 17 (1908).
25. See note 15, supra; and note 55, infra and following text.
26. See Nimmer, supra note 23, for a well-developed and persuasive argument that these "inroads" upon the copyright law in many instances deny
the author the protection intended by the statute.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952). The question of remedies are discussed only incidentally herein. See Note, 56 COLUm. L. REV. 585, 597-600 (1956).
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appropriation of an author's copyrighted work. The courts have engrafted this doctrine into the law,28 although the statute provides that
copyright "shall protect all the copyrightable component parts of the
work copyrighted. '29 The doctrine of substantial appropriation seems to
have been developed by the courts of equity, where actions for infringement or plagiarism were formerly brought. There, the rule that substantial injury must be shown in order to obtain relief was applied. 30
Secion 25 of the Copyright Act of 190931 provides that actions for injunction, damages and profits may be combined. Under this section
even if defendant's appropriation were too small to warrant an injunction, power would still be available to award actual damages.
Thus, if the equity rule were the sole basis for the requirement of
substantiality, it would seem that the requirement should be done
away with as a prerequisite to recovery. However, the doctrine of
substantial appropriation is still present today.32 The main situations
in which it is imposed are those in which defendant's work differs from
plaintiff's in underlying theme but possesses certain common embellishments; and conversely those in which defendant's work has the
same underlying theme as plaintiff's, but differs greatly in the development of the plot.3 In the former situation a finding of no infringement
is generally based upon the conclusion that appropriation is not substantial;M while in the latter, it is normally governed by the principle
that mere ideas are not copyrightable. 35 The refusal to protect ideas
presents the obvious problem of determining the dividing line between
28. See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.

1944).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 3 (1952).

(Emphasis added.)

30. See, e.g., Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144 Fed. 83, 84 (7th Cir.
1906), ajfd, 209 U.S. 20 (1908). This requirement was based on the equity
rule, not because it was a copyright case. Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HAuv. L. Rnv. 1125, 1127 (1951).
31. 35 Stat. 1075 (1909), now 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
32. Perhaps the true reason for its continued existence is to be found in the
policy of the constitutional provision. Prior writings serve as a foundation
for later cases. Imitation, at least to a limited extent, is necessary for progress
in the arts and sciences. "The world goes ahead because each of us builds on
the work of our predecessors. A dwarf standing on the shoulders of a giant
can see further than the giant himself. .. " Chafee, Reflections on the Law
of Copyright, 45 COLum. L. Rzv. 503, 511 (1945).
33. Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1918)

(may be copying of

language, plot, incidents). See Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64
HARv.L. REV. 1125, 1129 (1951).
34. E.g., McConnor v. Kaufman, 49 F. Supp. 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); Caruthers

v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
35. See note 20, supra, and preceding text. Nimmer states that such reasoning is equivalent to saying that copying a central idea only does not constitute
substantial appropriation, and that some courts have recognized this as the
real basis for the principle that ideas are not copyrightable, citing Salomon v.
RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 780, 782 (S.D.N.Y. 1942). Nimmer,
supra note 33 at 1129. He states that the only rationale for the application of
substantiality to the copying of embellishments is that to do otherwise "would
retard the production of literature." Id. at 1130.
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a "mere idea" and an effort which is a sufficiently substantial expression of the idea to warrant protection. Of the nature of this distinction,
Judge Learned Hand said:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns
of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the
incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most
general statement of what the play is about, and at times consists of only
its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are
no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use
of his "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his property never
2 6
extended.
There is considerable confusion as to whether "ideas," "plots," "theme,"

and "underlying idea," all mean the same. Some have treated the
terms as synonymous,37 while others have held that a theme38 or a
plot-9 may be protected. To escape from the necessity for such a
technical classification the courts rely upon the doctrine of substantial
appropriation. So, a theme developed as to be more than a "mere
idea" may not be protected because the use of such theme did not
involve an appropriation of a substantial portion of the proprietor's
work.40
In order to determine whether there has, in fact, been substantial
appropriation, the courts have used the term in various connotations,
using the same term to apply to different tests.
Audience Test: The "audience" or "ordinary observer" test seems to
be the one most used by the courts. Under this, the observer must
immediately and spontaneously receive the impression that defendant
36. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930),

cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). This "abstraction" test has been accepted by
some courts, e.g., Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 1943), and
criticized by name, Shipman v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537
(2d Cir. 1938), cited in Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HAnv.
L. REV. 1125, 1130-33 (1951).

37. Gropper v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 329 (S.D.N.Y.

1941).
38. See Underhill v. Belasco, 254 Fed. 838, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
39. Frankel v. Irwin, 34 F.2d 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
40. See Nimmer, Inroads on Copyright Protection, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1125,
1130-33 (1951) for a detailed discussion of this problem, and cases cited.
Nimmer contends that the substantial injury rule is unnecessary under the
present act, since damages can be awarded without enjoining defendant's

otherwise original work. Citing Ornstein v. Paramount Productions, Inc.,
9 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), which denied plaintiff the right to recover
where the appropriation was of the central theme (in fact, of almost the
entire story line) and where the court said plaintiff's right to recover was
largely limited to the details of his expression. Nimmer criticizes the result
in that the court is denying plaintiff the right to recover for the copying of
that which movie studios are most interested, the "central .dramatic core," and
is granting protection to that which is least marketable, his manner of presentation. He does not, however, pretend to suggest that ideas alone should be
protected, as that would seriously handicap the authors' search for material.
Nimmer, supra at 1132.
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copied or made use of plaintiff's work.41 The trier of fact is not to
dissect or make a critical analysis of the works involved,42 but he must
43
determine from his net impression whether there is infringement.
Therein lies the weakness of this test, i.e., the court is left to rely
solely upon its immediate visceral reactions 4 and cannot make a distinction between what has been appropriated and what, though similar,
is a result of independent effort. 45 A clever disguise by defendant could
prevent the ordinary observer from recognizing that the work is the
result of plaintiff's creative effort. In some instances, it may be impossible for an ordinary observer to detect substantial appropriation,
although this might be done by an expert critic. 46 Faced with so diffi-

cult a test at least one court has said that expert critical analysis may
be used to establish copying, but this must be coupled with the
audience test to establish degree of appropriation. This makes the
audience test focus upon substantial appropriation, 47 there being no
infringement unless the appropriation was enough to be obvious to
the observer. Some authorities have said that the comparison should
be made on the basis of one having a "practical understanding" of the
48
subject matter.
Critical Analysis Test: This test which is sometimes used by the
courts 49 involves some literary classification, dissection of the works,
and analysis. It is a useful doctrine in that it shows that the notion of
substantiality is based upon a qualitative not a quantitative concept;
but it is faulty in that it involves either some abstract speculation, or
some fairly rigid "scientific" approach. 50
41. "If an ordinary person who has recently read the story sits through the
presentation of the picture, if there had been literary piracy of the story, he
should detect that fact without any aid or suggestion or critical analysis by
others. The reaction of the public to the matter should be spontaneous and
immediate." Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 (9th Cir.) cert.
dismissed, 296 U.S. 669 (1933).

42. Twentieth Century-Fox v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1944)
(not to examine "hypercritically or with meticulous scrutiny.").
43. Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios, 18 F.2d 126, 128 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
44. Thus, expert testimony is not allowed. E.g., Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, supra note 41; Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
45. If a work is a result of independent effort, it is not infringement, though

it is similar to plaintiff's work. E.g., Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,
Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
46. McConnor v. Kaufman, 49 F. Supp. 738, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1943).
47. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946) (musical copyright).
Many cases have, however, used the test as an indication of copying per se.
Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1 (9th Cir.) cert. dismissed, 296 U.S.
669 (1933).
48. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 344 (1944). The
cases indicate that this is not, in fact, the standard used. E.g., Dam v. Kirk
LaShelle Co., 175 Fed. 902 (2d Cir. 1910); Hirsch v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.,

17 F. Supp. 816 (S.D. Cal. 1937).

49. E.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930),

cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).

50. MALEViNsKY, THE SCIENCE OF PLAYWRITING (1925) sets out an algebraic
formula for determining infringement. The formula has not been accepted,
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Quantitative Test: This goes back to the old equity cases wherein
suit was dismissed if the amount appropriated was not sufficient to
justify an injuction. Today, where the court may award both injunction and damages, there seems to be no reason why a defendant should
not be liable for damages, simply because the amount copied was small.
Too, if strictly followed, this test would not allow recognition of the
distinction between that which is protected, and that which is not,
such as ideas, or general themes.5 ' A purely quantitative analysis is
not sufficient. A qualitative analysis must be used to determine if the
alleged copying involved the taking of the material in the same, or
clearly similar, context as originally used.
Economic Detriment Test: Although the production of works of art
is not necessarily related to the desire for financial gain 52 the controlling factor here is one of monetary damage. This factor is more
properly relegated to the question of fair use.53
For the best results, a combination of the audience test, the critical
analysis test and the quantitative test 54 would seem to be required,
accompanied by a consideration of the policy behind the economic
detriment test. No one of these should be exclusive in any case,
although there will be cases in which the facts necessarily make one
of them controlling.
FAIR USE

Even if substantial appropriation of plaintiff's work is found, no
protection will be afforded if the appropriation falls within the scope
of fair use.55 Although this principle has long been recognized, 56
there have been no easily applied, general criteria as to what constialthough tests similar in reasoning to the formula have been used. Twentieth
Century-Fox v. Stonesifer, 140 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1944) (enumeration of similarities).
51. See note 20, supra,and accompanying text.
52. The use of this test alone would deny any recovery to the plaintiff where
the circumstances prevented his proving economic injury, even though there
may have been appropriation. However, the test has some significance as
financial reward as a stimulus to artistic production is within the Constitutional
policy.
53. The test appears to have come into the area of substantiality through the
citation of fair use cases in questions of infringement. See Universal Pictures
Corp. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 361 (9th Cir. 1947) (straight infringement), citing West Pub. Co. v. Thompson, 169 Fed. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1909)
(fair use). Some courts have used "substantial appropriation" and "fair use"
as the same thing. See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81
F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936). For the application of the test to fair use, see note
68 infra and accompanying text.
54. A quantitative test must be used to some degree in any test, to determine
whether the appropriation was sufficiently substantial.
55. See note 15 supra. This principle has been repeatedly stated and applied
to a variety of publications. Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CH. L. REV.
203, 204, note 11 (1954).
56. See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 344 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass.
1841).
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tutes fair use. It has been said to be "one of the most difficult questions
which can well arise for judicial consideration,"5 7 and has been called
the most troublesome issue in copyright law. 58 Mr. Justice Story
stated the difficulties in defining the elements of "fair use":
the identity of the two works in substance, and the question of piracy,

often depend upon a nice balance of the comparative use made in one of
the materials of the other; the nature, extent, and value of the materials
thus used; the objects of each work; and the degree to which each writer
may be fairly presumed to have resorted to the same common sources of
information, or to have exercised the same common diligence in the
selection and arrangement of the materials.59
The uncertainties involved in questions of fair use have led to the

general principle that the determination of "fair use" in a particular case is a pragmatic question to be considered in light of all the
facts of each case. However, some more specific criteria have been set
out: "the value of the part appropriated; its relative value to each of
the works in controversy; the purpose it serves in each; how far the
copied matter will tend to supersede the original or interfere with
60
its sale; and other considerations."
Certain types of appropriations have traditionally come under the
shelter of fair use. Scientific works and methods concerned with the
arts and sciences may be appropriated, if the original form is not
pirated.61 The basis of this rule is that the object of a work of science
or the useful arts is to give to the world the knowledge it contains
therein. If this cannot be accomplished without an infringement the
object is frustrated. And when the substance of the work cannot be
conveyed without the methods and diagrams contained therein, they
are considered as necessary incidents and given to the public. 62 If the
doctrine of fair use is not applied in these cases, the progress of the
arts and sciences is greatly impeded.63 The claim of fair use cannot,
however, be used under this theory to justify the "lifting" of entire
64
scenes from a dramatic work.
57. Lawrence v. Dana, 15 Fed. Cas. 26 (No. 8136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
58. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939).
59. Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 56, at 344. Story's last criterion would
seem to relate more to appropriation than fair use.
60. Carr v. National Capital Press, 71 F.2d 220 (D.C. Cir. 1934). The English Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. V, c. 6, has codified the principle of
fair use under the name of "fairdealing." At section 2(1) (i) it excludes
from acts constituting infringement: "(1) Any fair dealing with any work
for the purposes of private study, research, criticism, review or newspaper
sumary.
61. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
62. Id. at 103.

63. "Writers of books would be deprived of the proper growth in knowledge, and from taking advantage of the position to which the earlier writers
had carried the science under consideration." West Pub. Co. v. Edward
Thompson Co., 169 Fed. 833, 866 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).

64. Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354 (9th Cir.
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By far the most common application of the doctrine is in situations
wherein the material was appropriated for use in reviews, criticisms,
and commentaries. 65 Lawrence v. Dana stated the principle of this
application thusly:
Reviewers may make extracts sufficient to show the merits, or demerits of

the work, but they cannot so exercise the privilege as to supersede the
original book. Sufficient may be taken to give a correct view of the whole;
but the privilege of making extracts is limited to those objects, and cannot
be exercised to such an extent that the review shall become a substitute
6
for the book reviewed.S
This case states the most important factor in fair use: i.e., the value of
the copied portion of the work and its effect as tending to supersede or
become a substitute for the original. No limit is placed on the quantity taken; a quoted amount is permissible if it enables the critic to
evaluate the work. 67 The criterion is sometimes stated to be whether
the review has copied so much that it will reduce the demand for the
original.68 Thus, when defendant copied word lists for use by students, the use was not fair because both works met the same demand
on the market. 69 Greater freedom is permitted to writers in unrelated
fields than to competitors. Even so, the courts seldom find fair use
where the material is used for commercial gain, rather than an artistic
purpose. In one case, the use of three sentences from a medical book
for the purpose of advertising cigarettes was held unfair because of
the importance of the material.70 If the copied portion is necessary for
a review or criticism of a book in other publications, the use is fair,
regardless of its quantity; but if the appropriation stems from the
desire for commercial benefit, the use is unfair, again regardless of
quantity.7 ' This distinction is grounded on the theory that an author
1947) (57 consecutive comedy scenes, constituting twenty per cent of the

feature, were appropriated. The claim of "borrowing ideas" was denied also);

Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390, 397 (1940)
entire development of a play).

(the

65. This is in keeping with the constitutional grant of copyright to promote

the progress of science and useful arts. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8.

66. 15 Fed. Cas. 26, 61 (No. 8136) (C.C.D. Mass. 1869).
67. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). This
lack of limitation upon the quantity follows the English cases, as does the
test itself.
68. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 Fed. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). The
reduction in demand must not result from the fact that the criticism is adverse, but because the commentary discloses too fully the contents of the

original. Ibid.

69. College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 119 F.2d 874, 876 (2d
Cir. 1941). The reduction in demand factor is in reality an "economic detriment test," and its proper use is in the area of fair use, as it is used here. See
note 53 supra,and preceding text.
70. Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D.

Pa. 1938).
71. Ibid. There is also fair use when the material is appropriated for use
in the advancement of scientific knowledge. E.g., Sampson & Murdock Co. v.
Seaver-Radford Co., 140 Fed. 539, 541 (1st Cir. 1905).
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invites reviews and comments; they are necessary to the success of

his work, and if the work is scientific, others may build upon it as a
basis for further progress. Neither is involved when the appropriation
is made to secure financial gain to the borrower.
The courts have also applied the doctrine where the appropriated
work was used in a purely incidental manner. In KarZl v. Curtis Pub.

Co., an implied invitation to use a copyrighted song which had been
dedicated to a professional football team and adopted as the team's
official fight song was found. In an article in the Saturday Evening
Post about the team, the song was referred to and the eight line
chorus reproduced. It was said that the article did not compete with
the song, nor was the value of the song diminished since the author
impliedly "consented to a reasonable use thereof associated with the
Packers."72 Similarly, when the New Yorker published a story upon
the death of silent screen star Pearl White, and quoted the chorus of
a song entitled "Poor Pauline" which had been associated with the
actress, the use was found to be a fair one. These factors were considered: (a) the extent and relative value of the extracts; (b) the
purpose of the borrowing work; (c) whether the quoted portions might
be used as a substitute for the original work; and (d) the effect upon
73
the distribution of the original work.
These general criteria are actually a restatement of the principles
first announced by English judges after the Statute of Anne,7 4 and
later in this country.75 In one early English case, the copyrighted
work was a book on roads. Defendant's work was similar and the
names of places and other data were the same. Some errors present
in the original were also present in the borrowing book. The court
stated that while every man should be assured his copyright, "one
must not put manacles on science." 76 In another oft cited case,7 7 plaintiff published a book on the antiquities of Greece, using drawings
which he made himself. Defendant's work on doric architecture copied
72. 39 F. Supp. 836, 837 (E.D. Wis. 1941).

73. Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817 (S.D.N.Y.
1940). In another case where the copied material was used only incidentally
in the borrowing work, the court held that the use of a popular song to set
the mood for a short story was fair use. Schapiro, Bernstein &Co. v. P. F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) ("there could not have been
any direct falling off of the sales of the printed copies of the song because of
any competition from this story.").
74. 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710).
75. Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. Cmi. L. REv. 203, 209 (1954).

76. Cary v. Kearsley, 4 Esp. 168, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 680 (K.B. 1802). After
the court said it would be for the jury to decide whether this material was
taken to provide a useful book in which plaintiff's matter was rearranged, or
taken with a view to steal the copyright, the plaintiff nonsuited. See Yankwich, supra note 75, at 211, for a full discussion of this and other English
cases.
77. Wilkins v. Aikins, 17 Ves. 422 (1810).
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several prints of the original. It was held that one could not publish
either all or part of another's work under the pretext of quotation.
though he may use, what it is in all Cases difficult to define, fair Quotation
...The Question upon the whole is, whether this is a legitimate Use of the
Plaintiff's Publication in the fair Exercise of a Mental Operation, the character of an original Work. The Effect, I have no Doubt, is prejudicial7 8

These early English decisions served as precedents for American cases
arising under our own copyright act. In 1891, Mr. Justice Story
summed up the criteria of the American decisions in what is probably
the most quoted statement in the area of fair use:
In short, we must often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to thenature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.
Many mixed ingredients enter into the discussion of such questions. In
some cases, a considerable portion of the materials of the original work
may be fused, if I may use such an expression, into another work, so as to.
be undistinguishable in the mass of the latter, which has other professed
and obvious objects, and cannot fairly be treated as a piracy; or they may
be inserted as a sort of distinct and mosaic work, into the general texture
of the second work, and constitute the peculiar excellence thereof, and
then it may be a clear piracy7 9

In this case the copyright holder of the private papers of George
Washington published a work on his life consisting mainly of his
writings. The defendant published a short life of Washington, in autobiographical form, based on excerpts from plaintiff's work.8 0 Although
most of the copied material consisted of the writings of Washington,
it was held that the appropriation of so great an amount of the origi78. Ibid at 170. In Sayre v. Moore, reported in Cary v. Longman, 1 East
358, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 (K.B. 1801), Lord Mansfield stated: "we must
take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their
ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world may not be deprived of improvement, nor the progress of the arts be retarded."
79. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 348 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).

While Story found support from earlier English cases, English judges later
cited Story's formulation with approval. "The general principles guiding
the Court in cases of this description could hardly be found better stated than

in the . . . words used by Mr. Justice Story." Scott v. Stanford, L. R. 3 Eq.
718 (1867) (plaintiff's copyrighted statistical returns in importation of coal
were included in a work by defendant giving statistics on all minerals of the-

United Kingdom for a certain period. Plaintiff's material made up one-third.

of defendant's work. The court held that this appropriation exceeded "fairuse," in that, while defendant could check his work with plaintiff's, he could
not take the vital part of the original work).
80. Out of 866 pages in defendant's book, 353 were taken from plaintiff's:
work. Three hundred and nineteen of these consisted of writings of Washington, first published by the plaintiff. The other 34 pages had appeared in,
other works, but the master found them to have been taken from plaintiff's
work. Folsom v. Marsh, supra,note 79.
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nal which formed the basis of defendant's work, was not a fair use
and was an invasion of plaintiff's property right. The value of the
borrowed material was sufficiently great to outweigh the benefit to the
public from defendant's work.81 Both English and American courts
have relied upon Mr. Justice Story's clarification of the criteria involved and have in82 most instances been uniform in their application
of these principles.
The determination of whether a particular use is fair rests upon no
rigid rules which can be applied to all cases. 83 Each case must be
considered separately in the light of its particular fact situation.
However, the general considerations underlying any question of fair
use are: "(1) the quantity and importance of the portions taken; (2)
their relation to the work of which they are a part; (3) the result of
The
their use upon the demand for the copyrighted publication."
first two are measurable, at least to some degree. The last is highly
speculative in most cases.
Although there are different theories rationalizing the doctrine of
fair use,85 justification of the doctrine ultimately retreats to a reference
to the constitutional scheme of copyright.
On the whole, the tests are pragmatic. They strike a scrupulous balance
between the right of the author to the product of his creative intellect
and his imagination and the right of the public in the dissemination of
81. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342 (No. 4901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841).
82. Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 212 (1954).

Judge

Yankwich lists twelve instances wherein the 'fair use" doctrine has been
applied:
(1) the general borrowing of ideas;
(2) the imitations of methods or systems;
(3) abridgments and compendia;
(4) reviews, commentaries and criticisms;
(5) synopses or digests;
(6) scenes or themes from plays;

(7) satires, parodies or impersonations;
(8) textbooks and encyclopedias, legal or other;
(9) the taking of scientific or other ideas as a starting point for development
of one's own;
(10) compilations, such as statistical data, road and other maps and the like;
(11) reproduction of part of the words of a song in an article dealing with
personalities;
(12) reprinting of the substance of news articles or editorials. Ibid.
The first of these is usually not considered copyrightable in the first place,
and not based on fair use. See Id. at 207. Number (7) is only very briefly
discussed in this article (Id. at 207, N. 20), but is thoroughly analyzed in
Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REV.
1130 (1955).
83. The application of any set of rigid rules would be particularly difficult
in light of the many different situations that may arise. See note 82 supra.
84. Yankwich, What Is Fair Use?, 22 U. CI. L. REV. 203, 213 (1954), and
cases cited.
85. See SPRING, RISKS AND RIGHTS IN PUBLISHING, TELEVISION, RADIO, MOTION
PICTURES, ADVERTISING, AND THE THEATRE 178 (1952); Note, 56 COLUM. L. REV.
585,594 (1956).
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knowledge and the promotion and progress of science and useful arts

which is the constitutional mandate in which the American law of copyright originated.86
PARODY AND BURLESQUE

The terms "parody" and "burlesque" are used interchangeably,
although there are technical differences between the two terms. 87
Dramatic burlesque is travesty and distortion, while parody follows
the style of the author, applying lofty phrases to inconsequential subjects. 88 Although this form of burlesque is comparatively recent in
origin, parody has been recognized as a form of artistic creation since
the beginnings of literature.8 9 The form dates at least from the ancient
Greeks, who recognized parody as a distinct form of art. Parody
came to complete recognition through Aristophanes, mocking Aeschylus and Euripides. 90 Don Quixote began as a parody of the Spanish
novel of chivalry and became a classic. In France, Scarron, SaintAmant, and Marivaux achieved fame through writing parodies. The
fame attained by Marcel Proust's parodies, the "pastiche," are an
example of the esteem in which the art is held in France. In England,
from Chaucer onward, the great poets wrote parodies as did the
modern English novelists, particularly Fielding, Thackeray, and Beerbohm. By the nineteenth century in England burlesque came to the
fore, and almost every important play was burlesqued. In the United
States, many of the most successful plays were burlesqued, often at
the same time as the original. Poets and parodists themselves have
been parodied in this country. Parody and burlesque have been
practiced and recognized everywhere. 91
Both are essentially a critique of the original work. The legal
86. Yankwich, supra note 84 at 213-14. 'What is 'fair use' is to be deter-

mined by judicial criteria, not by the copyright owner's fiat." Thus the pub-

lisher cannot, by the usual notice in the front of a book (All rights reserved.
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner without the
express written permission... except in the case of reviews . . . , etc), limit

the extent of use which may be made of the work. Id. at 214. Cf. DE WOLF, AN

143 (1925).
87. Parody: "A composition in which the characteristic turns of thought
and phrase of an author are mimicked and made to appear ridiculous, especially by applying them to ludicrously inappropriate subjects. Also applied to
a burlesque of a musical work." SHORTER OxFoRD ENGLISH DIcTIoNARY (1936).
Burlesque has been recognized as a distinct form of entertainment: "A
type of theatrical entertainment, developed in the United States in the late
nineteenth century, characterized by broad humor and slapstick presentation,
at first consisting of a musical travesty, but later of short tunes, as songs,
ballet dancing, and caricatures of well-known actors or plays." WEBSTER'S
NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (2d ed. 1955).
88. The two terms will be used interchangeably in this note.
OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT

89. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B.
REV. 1130, 1133 (1955).

90. Aristotle called Hegemon of Thasos "the inventor of parody," although

another parody, on Homer, preceded Hegemon's work. Ibid.
91. Yankwich, supra note 89, at 1133-37. Judge Yankwich gives a concise,

yet thorough, outline of the literary history of parody and burlesque.
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problem arising therefrom properly relates to the area of fair use.
'The cases involving parody are scant in number and most of these
,opinions are unenlightening.
In an early English case 92 defendant made rough sketches for newspaper publication of "living pictures" in which actors reproduced
paintings. The court found no infringement since the sketches were
-fora different purpose than were the originals, did not compete, and
,did not reproduce nor intend to reproduce the value, essential qualities
or artistic feeling of the paintings. From this case the general principle emerged that a rude sketch or "a complete caricature a la Punch is
not a reproduction. '93 In a later case9 4 defendant published a parody
,of a popular song; no infringement was found but the question of
parody as infringement was not discussed.
The first thorough discussion of parody as infringement was in Glyn
-v. Weston Feature Film Co.95 There, defendant produced a vulgar
burlesque of the novel Three Weeks. Protection was denied because
of the fact that both works were indecent in character. Then the
court went on to the problem of parody. Justice Younger said that
if it were necessary for him to decide the case upon the aspect of
parody, still the result would be the same. In holding that parody is
not infringement, the court interpreted earlier cases as holding similarly.
In a later case 96 the proprietors of the dramatic rights to Tarzan and
the Apes brought suit against the producer of a comic acrobatic act
entitled "Warzan and His Apes." Besides the title, only two minor
incidents of the novel were burlesqued. The court held that the manner in which the incidents were treated in defendant's performance
prevented a finding of infringement.9 7 From these cases, two principles
92. Hanfstaengal v. Empire Palace, [1894] 3 Ch. 109, 70 L.T.R. (n.s.) 854.
93. Yankwich, supra note 89, at 1141. Also, a reproduction, consisting of
only the "outline of a grouping of pictures, no matter how accurate," lacks
the artistic qualities of the originals. Ibid.
94. Francis, Day &Hunter v. Feldman &Co., [1914] 2 Ch. 728.
95. [1916] 1 Ch. 261, 268, 114 L.T.R. (n.s.) 356. Some writers accept the
statement of the court as the correct interpretation of earlier English cases,
while others consider the statement dictum insofar as it holds that parody
can never be infringement. Yankwich, supra note 89, at 1143.
96. Carlton v. Mortimer, (K.B. Nov. 9, 1920) reported only in MAGGILLIVRAY,
COPYRIGHT CASES 194 (1917-23).
In the defendant's
97, "In the book both these features were serious ....
performance they were both comic to the last degree. They were intended to
be comic and produce nothing but laughter. So far as these incidents might
be said to be taken from the book, he was satisfied that they were a mere
burlesque of these incidents. Without going to the extent to which he understood Ir. Justice Younger went in the case of Glyn v. Weston Feature Film
Co... he was of opinion that the burlesquing of these two trifling incidents and
the production of the performance under a title... somewhat similar in sound
to, but yet different in fact from, the title of the novel did not amount to an
infringement of the plaintiff's rights." Id. at 195-96.
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were derived: neither a rude sketch or caricature of a whole work
98
nor a parody of minor incidents in a book exceeds fair use.
Although American writers generally agree that the fair use doctrine
applies to parody,99 there were only five reported cases on this point
prior to the "Gaslight" decision. In the earliest case, Bloom & Hamlin
v. Nixon,'00 defendant mimicked another actress singing a copyrighted
song. This was found to be a fair use. The court said that a parody
would not infringe "merely because a few lines of the original might
be textually reproduced,"' 01 but went on to emphasize the necessity
of good faith. In speaking of the mimicry, it was stated that plaintiff
was still protected against unauthorized public performance of the
02
song since defendant did not sing it, but only imitated it.
This was followed by two similar cases. In one, 03 the singing of
a verse and chorus of a copyrighted song, in imitation of a popular
singer, was held not to be infringement. 0 4 In the other case 05 the
same court, through a different judge, held that where the imitation
included the singing of an entire song, there was infringement. The
court distinguished the Bloom case'06 on the basis that there was insubstantial appropriation in that case. Imitation of the mannerisms of
another artist, it was said, can be made without words; but if words
07
are used, a whole song is too much.
In a later case by the same court,'08 a stage presentation entitled
"Nutt and Giff," imitating the cartoon characters Mutt and Jeff, was
held to be an infringement. Defendant claimed his performance was
privileged as a parody. In granting an injunction the court 'said:
98. Yankwich, supra note 89, at 1144.
99. See, e.g., BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 290
(1944); SPRING, op. cit. supra note 85, at 186; WEIL, AmERICAN COPYRIGHT LAW
432 (1917). But see COPINGER AND SKONE-JfAMES, LAW OF COPYRIGHT 131-32
(8th ed. 1948) (English text treating parody the same as all other cases).
100. 125 Fed. 977 (E.D.Pa. 1903).
101. Id. at 978.
102. "and the interest in her own performance is due, not to the song, but
to the degree of excellence of the imitation. This is a distinct and different
variety of the histrionic art from the singing of songs, dramatic or otherwise,
and I do not think that the example now before the court has in any way
interfered with the legal rights of the complainants." Id. at 979.
103. Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 Fed. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
104. No music was played during defendant's act, but this should make
little difference, as the lyrics too were copyrighted, and reproduced txactly as
arranged in the original. Ibid.
105. Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
106. Supra note 100.
107. "And if a whole song is required, it is not too much to say that the
imitator should select for impersonation a singer singing something else than
a copyrighted song." Green v. Luby supra note 105, at 288. The question
arises in these cases (supra notes 100, 103 and 105), where the imitation is
of a particular performer's style and mannerisms and infringement is charged
by the proprietor of the copyright in the song, whether defendants performance
constituted parody of the song at all.
108. Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
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A copyrighted work is subject to fair criticism, serious or humorous. So
far as is necessary to that end, quotations may be made from it, and it
may be described by words, representations, pictures, or suggestions. It
is not always easy to say where the line should be drawn between the
use which for such purposes is permitted and that which is forbidden.
One test which, when applicable, would seem to be ordinarily decisive,
is whether or not so much as [sic] has been reproduced as will materially
reduce the demand for the original. . . . The reduction in demand . . .
must result from the partial satisfaction of that demand by the alleged
infringing production. A criticism of the original work, which lessened
its money value by showing that it was not worth seeing or hearing, could
not give any right of action for infringement of copyright. 109
Such reduction in demand was found here." 0
In the last case,"' defendant sold words which parodied the lyrics
of popular songs. No music was involved. The court found the work
of the defendant to be infringement, but the question of parody as
fair use was not litigated.
In these cases, the courts were considering situations where the
actual words of the song were used in the parody, and cases in which
comic characters imitated other comic characters. Courts recognize
that parody might be the result of independent, creative effort but
hold that there is infringement if it covers the entire original work.
But the cases do not imply that a parody of a play or other work, or
2
a portion thereof, infringes because it is a parody."
To determine the present status of parody and burlesque, "Gaslight,""13 the latest and most important decision in this area, must
now be considered. The district court found that defendant's burlesque was copied for the most part from plaintiff's motion picture
and that the portion copied was a substantial part of plaintiff's work.
Thus, there was substantial appropriation," 4 and from this, infringement was found.
The basis for the court's finding is reflected in a subhead of the
109. Id. at 360.
110. "Nutt and Giff" is outright imitation of the original; another court has
interpreted this case as finding direct reproduction. King Features Syndicate
v. Fleisher, 299 Fed. 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1924) (copyright of a cartoon featuring
"Barney Google and Spark Plug" or "Sparky" [a horse] was infringed by
a doll called "Sparky," an exact reproduction of the cartoon horse). See
Note, The Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Characters, 68 HARv. L.
REV. 349, 356-63 (1954).
111. Leo Feist, Inc. v. Song Parodies, Inc., 146 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1944).
112. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN, B.
REv.1130, 1147 (1955).
113. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958)
(per curiam), affirming by an equally divided Court 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1956), 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955). See text following note 4 supra for
a statement of the facts and the findings of the court.
114. See text preceding note 9, supra for the points of similarity found by
the court. The two works were unusually similar in all their incidents, except
that defendant's treatment was burlesque. Ibid.
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opinion: "(g) A substantial taking by use of burlesque constitutes
infringement.""15 The court pointed out the great disparity in expenditures made by the parties in their respective productions, stating,
"The taking was for commercial gain in a competing entertainment
field." 6 The opinion continues thusly:
The serious, near tragic vein of the original "Gaslight," was converted into
the broad, low comic vein of the burlesque. Benny, using gags, puns,
exaggerated mimicry, slapstick and distortion, . .. has taken a substantial
part of plaintiff's property, "Gaslight," and inverted the mood from serious
to humorous....
From the discussion heretofore and the authorities collected we conclude
that plaintiffs have a property right in "Gaslight" which defendant may
not legally appropriate under the pretense that burlesque as fair use
justifies a substantial taking; that parodized or burlesque taking is to be
treated no differently from any other appropriation;that as in all other
cases of alleged taking, the issue becomes first, one of fact, i.e., what was
taken and how substantial was the taking; and if it is determined that
there was a substantial taking, infringement exists.117

The finding of substantial appropriation can probably be justified
under any of the tests of substantiality. In such a case, the proper
test should be the audience test relying upon the impression of both
works on the viewer, and this was used by the court. Under these
circumstances, the burlesque could be considered a "mere subterfuge"
for appropriating the original treatment of the movie and play. Although the conclusion could certainly be based upon that ground, this
was not stated in the opinion." 8 Rather, the theory was that there
could be no immunity on the ground of fair use, and that parody must
be treated in the same manner as a serious taking." 9 A rigid application of this theory would make parody and burlesque an infringement in nearly every case. In the appropriation of serious material,
the taking of two or three scenes is an infringement. 120 If the doctrine
of fair use is eliminated from the parody situation, and the usual rules
applied which are applied to ordinary copying all parody and burlesque would necessarily have to be considered infringement per se,
at least under the audience test. The parody "would inevitably have
to be cast in the form of the original.' 2' If the original is not recognized in the parodying work as its basis, there is, in fact, no parody
at all, or at the most, an extremely poor one. One of the purposes of
115. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 182
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
116. Ibid.
117. Id. at 183. (Emphasis added.)
118. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B.
REV. 1130, 1149-50 (1955).
119. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, supra note 115.
120. See, e.g., Chappell & Co. v. Fields, 210 Fed. 864, 865 (2d Cir. 1914).
121. Yankwich, supra note 118, at 1144-45.
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parody or burlesque (and that which makes it such,) is to mock,
spoof, poke fun at, and generally to be humorous. If the original is
not recognized by the audience, fulfillment of that purpose is impossible; the basis of the humor is destroyed. And, if the test normally
applied to serious work were applied to parody, it would eliminate
altogether the application of the fair use doctrine to true parody and
burlesque. In any case, it would severely limit, rather than expand,
the fair use concept. If "Gaslight" be followed, then the literary history of parody and burlesque loses all meaning.
The court in the "Gaslight" case seemed also to place undue stress
upon the fact that defendants were using the burlesque for financial
gain. 12 Material gain through parody goes back to the beginnings of
the form itself. The fact that the property of the copyright holder has
risen greatly in value in the modern world, and similarly that a parody
or burlesque will command much greater renumeration for its creator,
should not obscure the primary consideration of the English copyright
act and our own, which is to promote the progress of the arts and
sciences. Material gain is not primary, but secondary, in light of
this policy.
Although material factors are certainly considered in questions of
infringement, 2 3 the better view would seem to be that the doctrine of
fair use should be applied where there is slight likelihood of economic
detriment to the original author or where the value of the borrowing
work is sufficient to justify any detriment. 124 The parody situation
appears to justify the application of fair use. In "Gaslight," for example, any proof tending to show that the parody affected adversely
the rentals of the filmm was so speculative that it is useless to consider
it. As there was no direct competition between the two works, any
likelihood of actual impairment of sales resulting in economic detriment to the plaintiffs is remote. In reality, the publicity received
through the parody probably enhanced the value of plaintiffs' property.
In a subsequent case in the same court, Columbia Pictures Corp. v.
National Broadcasting Co.,12 6 plaintiff sued NBC for infringement of
copyright in the motion picture From Here to Eternity by a burlesque
of the movie entitled "From Here to Obscurity" performed by comedian Sid Caesar on his television program. Caesar's reliance upon the
form and substance of the original was not so extensive as was
Benny's; however, setting, general situation, underlying themes or
122. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, supra note 115. This

fact is mentioned elsewhere in the district court opinion, id. at 184.

123. See note 52 supra.
124. Note, 56 COLum. L. REv. 585, 603 (1956).
125. Any damages, if at all, would have to be to foreign distribution and
to re-issue value of the picture.
126. 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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plots, and details of development of the story line were used and
obviously recognizable in the parody.127 The plot of the skit, combining two of the underlying themes of the movie, was changed in vital
respects to conform to the comic purpose of the parody. Plot, sequence
and story development differed in many respects in the two works.
Dialogue differed greatly. The court found for the defendant; there
was no infringement.
The decision in the Caesar case does not make it clear whether or
not substantial appropriation was found or whether the appropriation
was substantial but within the protection of fair use. The court discussed both, and perhaps made both findings, although if the appropriation was not substantial, there was no reason to discuss fair use.
A finding that the appropriation was not substantial could be justified
from the facts, at least if the critical analysis test be used. Such a test
would reveal that Caesar's skit differed from the film in characters,
plot, sequence, form and other such essentials. In typical burlesque
fashion the dramatic, serious and tragic become incongruous, absurd,
and humorous. Intrinsically, there was much dissimilarity between
the two works, and this is the basic distinction between the Caesar and
"Gaslight" cases. 2 However, if the audio-visual, or "audience" test
is controlling, there is doubt as to whether a finding of non-substantiality could be justified. Under this test, anyone having seen the
movie would immediately and spontaneously receive the impression
that Caesar's skit was based on plaintiff's work.129 As the same court
used the audio-visual reaction test in the "Gaslight" case, 130 it may be
logically assumed that the Caesar case was approached in the same
way. If this be true, the holding in Caesar may be taken to be a determination that, although the appropriation was substantial, the work
was protected on the basis of fair use. The two works were not competing nor was there any significant economic detriment to plaintiff. This
was also true in "Gaslight." The court in Caesar did not stress the
fact that defendants were seeking material gain as it had done in the
first cases although defendants certainly expected financial reward
for their efforts. The different results in the two cases may be partly
explained on the basis of the court's increasing recognition of parody
131
as an independent, traditional, and creative art form.
127. Ibid. See text following note 121 supra.
128. Ibid. Cf. note 9 supra and preceding text.
129. In fact, if the viewer had not received this impression, the skit would
have lost much of its humor, and would have been somewhat of a puzzle to
him as he attempted to determine what was funny. The producers and Caesar
undoubtdely knew this, which is the reason the parody was written as it was.
130. Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165, 169
(S.D. Cal. 1955).
131. "Burlesque is a recognized form of literary art." Columbia Pictures
Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 352 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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The Caesar decision would be considered as substantially relaxing
the theory set out as the basis of the "Gaslight" decision. However,
the latter was affirmed by the court of appeals "for the reasons set
forth in the opinion of Judge James M. Carter,' 1 32 and the Supreme
Court's affirmance, although by a four to four, per curiam decision,
establishes the "Gaslight" decision as the one with which writers and
performers must comply.
CONCLUSION

Parody is in essence a criticism, and as such is a socially desirable
form of artistic creation deserving protection. Similarly, true burlesque
is not a mere imitation of an original work, but a critique, and cannot be mistaken or passed off for the original. 133 Parody makes no
attempt to reproduce the original work as it is written, which necessarily means that it lacks the artistic and literary quality of the borrowed work. It should not be denied protection as an independent
creative form because it is based upon the foundation of some original
work and because there is some imitation of that work, as there must
be, of necessity. 134 A formula which applies to parody or burlesque
"the sole test of substantiality of copying to be determined by similarity of sequence in 'order of events' in story development, and which
would disregard all others, finds no support in the literary history
of the English-speaking world.' 13 5 To apply any rigid test, or to deny
or limit the application of the doctrine of fair use to parody and burlesque would result in a serious threat to the existence of that portion
of the art of comedy. The limits of fair use should be expanded as
applied to parody or burlesque, not restricted as has been done. The
limiting consideration is the integrity of the form itself.
In the light of literary history and the purposes of the copyright laws,
we should extend rather than constrict the boundaries of "fair use." The
controlling question should be, not whether the parody or burlesque contains the skeleton or outline of the play or story it criticizes or ridicules,
but whether it is true parody or a mere subterfuge for appropriatinganother person's creation.136
From the decision in the Caesar case, an inference may be made that
courts are becoming more aware of parody and burlesque as being
132. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 537 (9th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S.
43 (1958) (4-4, per curiam).

133. Yankwich, Parody and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B.
REv. 1130, 1153-54 (1955), and cases cited ("the two things are completely dif-

ferent, and incapable of comparison in any reasonable sense." Francis, Day &
Hunter, Ltd. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 56 T.L.R. 9, 12 [1937]).
134. Yankwich, supra note 133, at 1153. See note 121 supra and following
text.
135. Yankwich, supra note 133, at 1154. Similarity of an "order of events"
is not always used and is not a conclusive test. Shipmen v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 536 (2d Cir. 1938).
136. Yankwich, supra note 135, at 1152. (Emphasis added.)
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traditional, independent art forms. Although the Supreme Court's
decision in the "Gaslight" case will certainly dampen this new awareness, that decision can hardly be characterized as a strong one. The
courts should consider the decision of the Supreme Court narrowly,
limiting it only to its particular facts. Any other attitude would have
the unfortunate result of applying principles established from the
facts of an extreme case to all cases of parody and burlesque. The
reasoning in the "Gaslight" case contains unfortunate implications
for future cases. 137 The courts must re-examine these principles of
the copyright law as applied to parody and burlesque, within the
framework of a constitutional purpose to promote the progress of the
arts and sciences and in consideration of the history and unique qualities of the two forms. Parody and burlesque require the application
of the doctrine of fair use. Without such application they cannot last.'3
As recognized forms of artistic effort, they must not be allowed to
wither away upon the basis of judicial principles to which they were
unfairly subjected.
137. See text following note 10 supra.

138. See text accompanying note 121 supra.

